A Note on Capital Commitment and Cournot Competition with Labour-Managed and Profit-Maximising Firms

This paper shows that the discussion of Lambertini and Rossini (1998) as to the strategic investment levels oflabour-managed firms in a labour-managed (LM) duopoly is misleading. This is due to the fact that there is no duality between the conditions for maximisation and minimisation, and what is worse, an equilibrium needed for comparison is interior when the investment behaviour of the firms is discussed along the conventional method. We reconsider whether they overinvest or underinvest in R&D, employing a more general model with R&D spillovers. It is demonstrated that results obtained in the LM duopoly are similar to those in a conventional duopoly of profit-maximising firms

Strategic Games and R&D Investment with Spillovers

The paper considers the problem of whether in a strategic two-stage game duopolistic firms make an overinvestment or underinvestment in R & D when there are their spillovers. We deal with two cases of Cournot quantity and Bertrand price competitions. It is shown that in Cournot (Bertrand) competition each firm has an incentive to use a larger (less) or less (larger) investment than the one required to minimize the costs of investment according as its rival's spillover rate is relatively small or large

Disclosure Policy, and Competition and Cartelization in R&D: Cournot and Bertrand Competition

This paper considers whether firms have incentives to disclose their R&D information to their rivals in Cournot−quantity setting and Bertrand−price setting models. Furthermore, we compare market performances, e.g. R&D investments, prices and profits, in these models. It is shown that whether they have such incentives depends only on the signs of cross−price effects in demand functions, irrespective of the type of competition, e.g. Cournot or Bertrand competition. When making comparisons of them among four modes, we find that the formation of R&D cartels tends to increase the expenditure of R&D investment and then gains more profits. Alternatively, we point out that quantity−setting firms gain more profits in the presence of R&D cooperation than in the absence of it when products are substitutes in terms of Cournot competition

R&D, Privatization, Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly, and Productive Efficiency

We investigate R&D behavior of public firms by using oligopoly models with Cournot−type−quantity and Bertrand−type−price competition. Then the following results are obtained. When public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in quantity competition, (i) the public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in a public monopoly market than in that market if they are substitutes, and (ii) the public firm has a less incentive to invest in R&D in the oligopoly market if they are complements. Furthermore, suppose that public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market are involved in price competition. (i) If the products are complements, then a public firm has a greater incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market; and (ii) if they are substitutes, then the public firm has a less incentive to invest in cost−reducing R&D in the public monopoly market than in the mixed oligopoly market

What, How and Why Happened in Afghanistan?: A Study ofPolitical Economic History of the Early 20th Century

It is significant to thoroughly scrutinize past practices and feats, to identify important factors towards developmental failure and success and to avoid mistakes for the future of an industrialized and prosperous Afghanistan. As a result of profound research, a number of researchers have added to the literature on the country’s history, culture, wars, strategic importance and position as a buffer state that cover Afghan polity, ideological dimensions, and social and cultural intricacies. However, few scholarly works exist on the political economy in general and on the historical economic performances and policies in detail. Drawing upon immense and varied literature, the purpose of this paper is to analyze and describe historical and social changes, economic structures and strategies of Afghanistan with a detailed account of (i) political vision, (ii) institutional reforms, (iii) economic agendas, and (iv) development progress in the light of economic development theory and practice. We conclude that being provided right policies and firm political determination, Afghanistan has the potential to become a more developed country in the short span of time

Quality choice, vertical product differentiation, and labor-managed oligopoly

Although quality choice of profit-maximizing oligopolistic firms has been widely analyzed, it is rare to find such an analysis of labor-managed oligopolistic firms. This paper considers the relationship between vertical product differentiation and labor-managed firms in either partial or full market coverage by using a two-stage game model. At the second stage they are involved in either Bertrand or Cournot competition. Then some results, which are different from those derived from the conventional firms, are obtained. For example, 1) when labor-managed firms are involved in price competition in an output market, there exists an interior solution only in an extremely limited case; 2) fixed costs affect not only price and output levels but also the level of quality under both price and quantity competition; and 3) it is impossible to analyze under full market coverage, irrespective of whether labor-managed firms are involved in price or quantity competition in an output market

対中国進出日系企業の研究開発の現状分析

中国経済の目覚しい発展がその経済開放政策の実施以降続いている。中国の経済発展の原動力の1つが外国企業の中国進出および中国の外資導入策である。賃金の安い労働力を求めて多くの日本企業が中国に進出した。そして90年代後半以降その動きが加速化された。この流れを受けて、日本企業の対中国直接投資の現状とその特徴について予備的な分析を行った